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Abstract
The Web Bulletin Board (WBB) is a key component of verifiable election systems. It
is used in the context of election verification to publish evidence of voting and tallying
that voters and officials can check, and where challenges can be launched in the event of
malfeasance. In practice, the election authority has responsibility for implementing the
web bulletin board correctly and reliably, and will wish to ensure that it behaves correctly
even in the presence of failures and attacks. To ensure robustness, an implementation
will typically use a number of peers to be able to provide a correct service even when
some peers go down or behave dishonestly. In this paper we propose a new protocol to
implement such a Web Bulletin Board, motivated by the needs of the vVote verifiable
voting system. Using a distributed algorithm increases the complexity of the protocol
and requires careful reasoning in order to establish correctness. Here we use the Event-B
modelling and refinement approach to establish correctness of the peered design against
an idealised specification of the bulletin board behaviour. In particular we show that for
n peers, a threshold of t > 2n/3 peers behaving correctly is sufficient to ensure correct
behaviour of the bulletin board distributed design. The algorithm also behaves correctly
even if honest or dishonest peers temporarily drop out of the protocol and then return.
The verification approach also establishes that the protocols used within the bulletin
board do not interfere with each other. This is the first time a peered web bulletin board
suite of protocols has been formally verified.
1 Introduction
Verifiable voting systems such as Preˆt a` Voter [CRS05, RBH+09], Scantegrity [CCC+10],
Helios[Adi08], Wombat [BNFL+12], STAR-Vote [BBB+13] and Civitas [CCM08] typically
have a requirement to publish information concerning votes cast and how they have been
processed, in order to provide verifiability. Voters and other external parties are able to
check the published information and challenge the election if any cheating has occurred.
Such systems are generally described using a “Bulletin Board” for publication: a repository
of the information collected throughout the election, made publicly available for inspection.
There are certain (generally implicit) security assumptions on the bulletin board: that once
items are on the bulletin board then they will not be removed, that the final information
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given at the end of the election is fixed and cannot be adjusted, and that it will provide the
same view of that information to all parties. For example, Adida’s characterisation [Adi06]
states that “Cryptographic voting protocols revolve around a central, digital bulletin board.
As its name implies, the bulletin board is public and visible to all, via, for example, phone
and web interfaces. All messages posted to the bulletin board are authenticated, and it is
assumed that any data written to the bulletin board cannot be erased or tampered with.”
Alternatively a bulletin board has been described as a “broadcast channel with memory”
[Pet05, CGS97, KTV12], with a Web Bulletin Board treated as a public broadcast channel.
Achieving these properties in an implementation is not so straightforward. A current view is
that “we don’t know how to build a secure bulletin board” [Wag13], and to date there is no
generally available implementation of a secure bulletin board. In practice bulletin boards are
generally implemented by collecting election information as it progresses, and publishing the
information via a website, as done for example by Helios, Wombat, and STAR-Vote, or making
it available via a git repository as in the Norway 2013 e-voting trial[Nor13]. However, these
are not tamper proof, and information can be changed on them unless there are additional
safeguards such as the cryptographic mechanisms based on hash chains proposed by Heather
and Lundin [HL08]. The design of STAR-VOTE uses multiple peers to tolerate faulty or
malicious components, and has the election authority sign the bulletin board contents, thus
changes can occur only with the collusion of the electoral authority.
The bulletin board presented in this paper arises from the need to implement a bulletin board
as part of the vVote system being developed for the Victorian State election 2014 [BCH+12].
The Victorian State election runs over a two week period of “early voting” before election day
itself, and the bulletin board is required to publish its information daily during the election.
For robustness and trust the bulletin board will be comprised of a number of peers to receive
items, provide receipts, and publish information. The rate at which votes may be received
means that the peers cannot sustain the overhead of a consensus protocol every time an item
is posted, so they each maintain a local copy of their view of the bulletin board, and agree
on the bulletin board only when it is time to publish. A further challenge is that the bulletin
board may need to reject some items, for example audit of a ballot previously used to vote, or
any vote on a ballot previously used or audited, so that incompatible posts are not published.
We achieve this requirement provided a threshold of the peers are honest and operational
the bulletin board will behave correctly, even in the presence of individual peers going down,
external attacks and a minority of dishonest peers.
This paper presents a new bulletin board protocol designed to run with a network of peers and
to operate correctly when a threshold of the peers are honest and operational. We provide a
formal model and verification of the protocol, using the framework of Event-B [Abr10]. We
verify the protocol in the context of a Dolev-Yao attacker [DY83], who has control over the
network and a minority of peers.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents and motivates the protocol, Section 3
introduces the Event-B framework and the refinement approach to modelling and verification,
and the way it will be applied to the protocol and Sections 4–7 provide the details of the four
stages of modelling aspects of the protocol and the verification proofs in terms of simulation.
Section 8 discusses sufficient conditions for liveness, and Section 9 concludes with a discussion
of what has been achieved, its relationship to related work, and its context.
2
2 A peered bulletin board protocol
We present an implementation of a bulletin board that accepts items to be posted (if they do
not clash with previous posts), issues receipts, and periodically publishes what it has received.
The bulletin board published for any particular period must include all items that had receipts
issued during that period. Robustness is achieved through the use of several peered servers
which cooperate on accepting items, issuing receipts, and publishing the bulletin board. They
make use of a threshold signature scheme which allows a subset of the peers above a particular
threshold to jointly generate signatures on data. The peers collectively provide the bulletin
board service as long as a threshold of them are honest, and as long as a threshold of them
are involved in handling any item posted to the bulletin board. Thus the implementation is
correct in the presence of communication failures, unavailability or failure of peers, and also
dishonesty of peers. The threshold t required to achieve this must be greater than two-thirds
of the total number n of peers: t > 2n/3. There is no single point of failure: the system can
tolerate failure or non-participation of any component, as long as a threshold of peers remain
operational at any stage. It also allows for different threshold sets of peers to be operational
at different times. For example, a peer may be rebooted during the protocol, missing some
item posts, and may then resume participation.
The key properties we require for this bulletin board are:
(bb.1) only items that have been posted to the bulletin board may appear on it;
(bb.2) any item that has a receipt issued must appear on the published bulletin board;
(bb.3) two clashing items must not both appear on the bulletin board;
(bb.4) items cannot be removed from the bulletin board once they are published.
It follows from bb.2 and bb.3 that if two items clash then receipts must not be issued for
both of them.
The bulletin board provides a protocol for the posting of an item and its acknowledgement
with a receipt, and provides another two related protocols for the publishing of the bulleting
board: an optimistic one, and a fallback.
2.1 Posting and acknowledgement
The protocol for posting an item x in period p, and issuing the acknowledgement, is as
follows:
1. User → Pi : x (for each i ∈ I )
each Pi checks no clash between x and previous posts
2. Pi → Pj : sigski (p, x ) (for each i , j ∈ I , j 6= i)
each Pi waits for at least a threshold number of signatures
3. Pi → User : sigsski (p, x ) (for each i ∈ I )
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xUser Peer1 Peer2 Peer3 Peer4
sigsk1(p, x )
sigsk2(p, x )
sigsk4(p, x )
sigsk3(p, x )
sigssk1(p, x ) sigssk2(p, x )
sigssk3(p, x ) sigssk4(p, x )
x
x
x
sigSSK (x )
construct
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3
Figure 1: Posting Protocol
To post an item x , the User should first send x to each of the peers, as shown in Round
1. Each peer checks that x does not clash with any posts it has received previously (from
the current period or previous periods). The peers then sign (p, x ) with their own individual
signing key, and send the result to each of the other peers, as shown in Round 2. Peers store
all of the received signatures into their local database. Finally, once a peer has obtained a
threshold number of signatures on (p, x ) (including its own), it sends its share of the threshold
signature on (p, x ) back to the User. Once the User has received a threshold number of such
shares it is able to combine them to provide a signature on (p, x ), and this serves as the
receipt. This protocol is shown in Figure 1. It is repeated for each item to be posted in the
period.
2.2 Publishing the Bulletin Board
The bulletin board is published at the end of the period. The aim is for the peers to agree on
the contents of the bulletin board and to issue their signature share on it to a public hosting
service that can combine the signature shares and make the resulting signature publicly
available.
Peer i ’s local record of the bulletin board Bi ,p is those items that it has received a threshold
number of signatures on, which are those items it issues a signature share on towards the
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Figure 2: Optimistic Protocol
receipt.
The peers first of all run an optimistic protocol: this will succeed if at least a threshold of
the local bulletin boards agree, which will be the case in practice if all peers are working
properly. The optmistic protocol is given as follows:
1. Pi → Pj : sigski (p, h(Bi ,p)) (for each i , j ∈ I , j 6= i)
each Pi checks the hashes from a threshold of peers agree
2. Pi →WBB : Bi ,p , sigsski (p, h(Bi ,p)) (for each i ∈ I )
The peers each sign a hash of their local copy of the bulletin board, and send them to each
other. If a threshold agree then they can issue the bulletin board and a share of the threshold
signature on the hash. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
If the optimistic protocol does not run successfully, because the hashes do not agree, that
indicates that local bulletin boards are different. In this case the peers exchange information
about their bulletin boards using the fallback protocol as follows:
1. Pi → Pj : Di ,p (for each i , j ∈ I , j 6= i)
each Pi adds any missing information received from others to its own database
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D2,p
D4,p
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Round 1
Update
Figure 3: Fallback Protocol
Each peer sends its database of signatures it has collected from the posting period to all the
other peers, which update their databases with any signatures that are missing. They can
then recalculate their local bulletin board. This is illustrated in Figure 3.
After the fallback protocol is completed, the peers return to the optimistic protocol and
repeat. This is only required once for our liveness assumptions. We assume for liveness either
(1) that all peers are online and able to communicate during the fallback protocol (with no
assumptions about the posting phase or correct behaviour of users), or (2) that a threshold
of honest peers are online and able to communicate during the fallback protocol, and at every
stage of the posting phase a threshold set of peers were live and able to communicate and that
the posting users behaved honestly. Under either of these two assumptions only one round of
the fallback protocol is needed. The difference with Byzantine Agreement protocols, which
tend to require up to (n− t) + 1 rounds to achieve agreement, is that the databases the peers
start with have some consistency between them. If thresholds of peers received posts correctly
in the posting phase, then the honest peers involved in the exchange of information in the
fallback protocol will all obtain the full bulletin board after one round. Further explanation
is provided in Section 8.
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machine M
variables v
invariant I (v)
events init , ev , . . .
end
ev =̂
when G(v)
then v :| BA(v , v ′)
end
Figure 4: Template of an Event-B machine and an event.
3 Modelling and Verification Framework
We use the action systems approach of Event-B [Abr10, MAV05] as our formal framework to
model the protocol and to verify it. In this approach systems are described in terms of the
states that they can be in, and the events that transform the state.
A system is defined as a machine, which encapsulates its state, and its events. State informa-
tion is described in terms of state variables and invariants on them. The machine describes
how the state is initialised, and how it can be updated with events.
The Event-B approach supports refinement, a relationship showing when one system imple-
ments another. This approach allows a specification to be captured as an ideal machine
that expresses the required behaviour. An implementation satisfies the specification if it is a
refinement.
Figure 4 illustrates how a machine is defined. Machine M is given with a list of state variables
v , a state invariant I (v), and a set of events ev , . . . to update the state. Initialisation is a
special event init which sets the initial state of the machine, and its guard is true.
Each event has a guard G(v) over the variables v , and a body, usually written as an assignment
S on the variables. The assignment is associated with a before-after predicate BA(v , v ′)
describing changes of variables upon event execution, in terms of the relationship between
the variable values before (v) and after (v ′). For example, the assignment v := v + 1 is
associated with the predicate v ′ = v + 1. The body can also be written as v :| BA(v , v ′),
which assigns to v any value v ′ which makes the predicate BA(v , v ′) true (see right of Fig. 4,
where BA is the predicate in event evt). In Event-B an event may also introduce local
variables, which can be included in the guard (which constrains what values they can take),
and in the body where they can be used to define the change of state. Such events are
constructed as:
evt =̂
any x
where G(v , x )
then v :| BA(v , x , v ′)
end
Some of the conditions on x may be included in the any clause rather than the where clause
for readability (see e.g. post and a msg1 of Figure 7). Nondeterministic assignment has its
own syntax: x :∈ S assigns x some arbitrary element of S . This is an abbreviation for
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any s where s ∈ S then x := s end.
In this paper, all events have some feasible final state: whenever G(v , x ) is true then there
is some v ′ such that BA(v , x , v ′) holds.
The Event-B approach to semantics, provided in [Abr10, MAV05], is to associate proof obli-
gations with machines. The key proof obligation on an event is that it preserves the invariant:
when an event is called within its guard, then the state resulting from executing the body
should meet the invariant. For example, in the case of the machine in Fig. 4 we obtain the
following proof obligation INV on events which have the form of evt. It states that if the
invariant I holds on v , and the guard G(v) is true, and the before-after predicate relates v ′
to v , then the invariant I should be true on the state v ′ reached after the event:
I (v) ∧ G(v) ∧ BA(v , v ′)
`
I (v ′)
INV
Discharging this proof obligation establishes that the event preserves the invariant. The
machine is consistent if this is true for all of its events. It is true for all events in all machines
presented in this paper: establishing this is one part of the proof of correctness.
3.1 Event-B refinement
In Event-B, the intended refinement relationship between machines is directly written into
the refinement machine definitions. As a consequence of writing a refining machine, a number
of proof obligations arise. Here, a machine and its refinement take the following form:
machine M0
variables v
invariant I (v)
events init0, ev0, ev
′
0, . . .
end
machine M1
refines M0
variables w
invariant J (v ,w)
events init1, ev1, ev
′
1, . . .
end
The machine M0 is refined by machine M1, written M0 4 M1, if the given linking invariant
J (v ,w) on the variables of the two machines is established by their initialisations, and pre-
served by all events. Any transition performed by a concrete event of M1 can be matched by
a step of the corresponding abstract event of M0, or matched by skip for newly introduced
events, in order to maintain J . This is similar to the approach of downwards simulation data
refinement [DB01], where the simulation relation plays the role of the linking invariant. For-
mally, the refinement relation M0 4 M1 between abstract machine M0 and concrete machine
M1 holds if the following proof obligations given below hold for all events:
GRD REF: Guard Strengthening If a concrete event matches an abstract one, then this
rule requires that when the concrete event is enabled, then so is the matching abstract
one. The rule is:
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I (v) ∧ J (v ,w) ∧ H (w)
`
G(v)
GRD REF
INV REF: Simulation This ensures that the occurrence of events (including initialisa-
tion) in the concrete machine can be matched in the abstract one. If there is a matching
abstract event then the rule is:
I (v) ∧ J (v ,w) ∧ H (w) ∧ BA1(w ,w ′)
`
∃ v ′.(BA0(v , v ′) ∧ J (v ′,w ′))
INV REF1
New events are treated as refinements of skip. In this case the abstract state does not
change (i.e., v ′ = v), and the rule is
I (v) ∧ J (v ,w) ∧ H (w) ∧ BA1(w ,w ′)
`
J (v ,w ′)
INV REF2
Refinement with respect to A
It may be that an environment interacts with a machine M0 only on some subset A of its
events. In that case we can consider a refinement M1 of M0 with respect to A. This requires
that M1 also has all the events A, and that GRD REF and INV REF1 must hold for all
the events in A. However, other events of M1 can be matched either by skip, or by some
matching event (not in A) in M0, in which case the guard must also match. Thus for events
not in A we weaken the requirement to the single proof obligation GRD INV REF3:
I (v) ∧ J (v ,w) ∧ H (w) ∧ BA1(w ,w ′)
`
J (v ,w ′) ∨ (G(v) ∧ ∃ v ′.(BA0(v , v ′) ∧ J (v ′,w ′)))
GRD INV REF3
We will use this notion of refinement to express our requirements on the bulletin board
protocol.
3.2 Framework for Bulletin Board Modelling and Verification
We are concerned with developing a peered bulletin board that can operate correctly in
an unreliable environment, and with some potentially misbehaving peers. In particular,
communications between the bulletin board and its users may be under the control of an
9
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a msg1
post publish
a msg2
a msg3
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Figure 5: BBSpec: ideal bulletin board and communication medium
adversary, who may intercept, divert, block, duplicate and spoof messages. The bulletin
board is designed for use in in such an environment.
The specification of the bulletin board will encapsulate the required behaviour. This will
be described as an Event-B model BBSpec with a description in terms of the architecture
shown in Figure 5, of an ideal bulletin board in the context of a reliable communication
medium. Users may use the events post , ack and publish to interact with the bulletin board,
but communication occurs via the medium. The bulletin board has its own corresponding
interactions with the medium, labelled a msg1, a msg2 and a msg3. These events are also
within the model BBSpec, but they are not accessible directly to users. Hence it is the
behaviour of BBSpec on the set of events {post , ack , publish} that must be matched by any
implementation.
The bulletin board implementation uses a number of peers, for robustness and in order to
distribute trust. There are a total of n peers, and we use a threshold signature scheme in
which we require t shares in order to produce a signature. Our model of the protocol will be
an Event-B model BBProt , in which we consider the adversary to control the communication
medium to and from the peers and the WBB , and between them. Hence any communication
can be blocked. We also consider that the adversary can control up to n − t peers. This
means that such peers can sign and create any messages for sending, whether or not such
messages are in accordance with the protocol, provided they have the appropriate keys.
We consider that (at least) a threshold t of the n peers are honest: that they follow the
protocol. Without loss of generality we will consider peers 1 to t to be honest, and t + 1
to n may behave arbitrarily (which includes honest behaviour). This labelling of the peers
captures the general case where some arbitrary n − t peers may be dishonest, since the
protocol is symmetric with respect to the labelling of the peers.
The model BBProt includes the Dolev-Yao adversary, and peers t + 1 to n considered to be
under the control of the adversary. The setup is illustrated in Figure 6.
BBProt offers the same three external events as BBSpec, namely post , ack and publish.
However it contains the peers explicitly, including peers controlled by the adversary, and so
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Figure 6: BBProt : Protocol model for analysis, with t = 3 and n = 4
the communication patterns with and between the peers will be quite different to those in
the specification. Those communications are modelled by events c msgi . The requirement
for correctness will be that BBSpec 4 BBProt with respect to {post , ack , publish}.
The model BBProt includes the events that make up the various bulletin board protocols.
Since these events can be performed whenever their guards are true, this means that in-
terleavings of different protocols are naturally considered within this framework. Thus our
approach to verification automatically allows for possible interference between the protocols,
and a proof of correctness establishes that the protocols cannot interfere in an adverse way.
3.3 A useful lemma
The following lemma and corollary will be useful in the refinement proofs.
Lemma 3.1. If A ⊆ {1, . . . ,n}, B ⊆ {1, . . . ,n}, #A > t, #B > t, and t > 2n/3, then there
is some j 6 t such that j ∈ A and j ∈ B.
Proof. We first prove that if A ⊆ {1, . . . ,n}, B ⊆ {1, . . . ,n}, C ⊆ {1, . . . ,n}, #A > t ,
#B > t , #C > t , and t > 2n/3, then #(A ∩ B ∩ C ) > 1.
We use the law #X + #Y = #(X ∪Y ) + #(X ∩Y ). Observe that A ∪ B ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} and
so #(A ∪ B) 6 n. We obtain:
#(A ∩ B) = #A + #B −#(A ∪ B)
> t + t − n
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Then
#((A ∩ B) ∩ C ) = #(A ∩ B) + #C −#((A ∩ B) ∪ C )
> (2t − n) + t − n
= 3t − 2n
Now t > 2n/3, so 3t − 2n > 0. Thus #((A ∩ B) ∩ C ) > 1 as required.
The result then follows immediately by setting C = {1, . . . , t}: then there is some j ∈
A ∩ B ∩ C , i.e. j 6 t and j ∈ A ∩ B .
Corollary 3.2. If A ⊆ {1, . . . , t}, B ⊆ {1, . . . , t}, #A > 2t−n, #B > 2t−n, and t > 2n/3,
then there is some j 6 t such that j ∈ A and j ∈ B.
Proof. The corollary follows from Lemma 3.1 on A ∪ {t + 1, . . . ,n} and B ∪ {t + 1, . . . ,n}.
4 One-shot Bulletin Board
To structure the analysis, we will consider the protocol in four stages:
1. Firstly we have a single posting phase and a single commit phase for publication of the
items posted to the bulletin board.
2. We next introduce multiple commit phases for multiple updates of the published bulletin
board.
3. Next we allow for the BB to reject some posts based on previous posts
4. Finally we optimise each commit phase to optimistic and fallback, using hash functions.
Our first model, introduced here, provides a one-shot bulletin board, which accepts posts for
a period of time and then publishes its contents.
4.1 Specification
We model the specified behaviour in terms of the bulletin board communicating with its
environement over a medium as illustrated in Figure 5. We now give definitions for the
events within that framework. The given set ITEM is the set of all items that can validly be
posted to the bulletin board. In practice there will be some mechanism for recognising a valid
post, such as a signature, but for the purposes of this paper we abstract such a mechanism
and assume that only elements of ITEM are posted. This corresponds to the expectation
that posts not from ITEM will be recognised and rejected by the bulletin board.
As described earlier, signatures are used to prevent the faking of receipts and the publishing
of the bulletin board contents. The bulletin board uses (threshold) signature key SSK to
sign receipts, and to sign the publication of the board. We define
RECEIPT = {sigSSK (x ) | x ∈ ITEM }
PUBLISH = {sigSSK (B) | B ⊆ ITEM }
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machine BBSpec1
variables EA,R,C
invariant EA ⊆ ITEM ∪ RECEIPT ∪ PUBLISH
R ⊆ ITEM
C ⊆ ITEM
events
init =̂ EA := {} ‖ R := {} ‖ C := {};
post(x ) =̂ when x ∈ ITEM then EA := EA ∪ {x} end;
r ←− ack =̂ r :∈ (EA ∩ RECEIPT );
P ←− publish =̂ P :∈ (EA ∩ PUBLISH );
a msg1 =̂
any x ∈ EA ∩ ITEM
then R := R ∪ {x}
end;
a msg2 =̂
any x
where x ∈ R ∧ (sigSSK (B) ∈ EA ⇒ x ∈ B)
then EA := EA ∪ {sigSSK (x )} ‖ C := C ∪ {x}
end;
a msg3 =̂
any Y
where C ⊆ Y ⊆ R ∧ EA ∩ PUBLISH = {}
then EA := EA ∪ {sigSSK (Y )}
end
end
Figure 7: Bulletin Board Model incorporating the environment
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Allowing for untrusted peers requires us to include some nondeterminism within the specifi-
cation of the bulletin board, to reflect (bb.1) and (bb.2) above. In particular, dishonest peers
and the untrusted medium can prevent receipts from being issued for some received posts,
so the specification must allow for this possibility. The model of the bulletin board thus uses
two databases: R consisting of received posts, and C consisting of confirmed posts—those
which have been acknowledged with receipts.
When the board B is published, anything published must be in R in accordance with (bb.1);
and all confirmed posts C must be published in accordance with (bb.2). Thus we require
C ⊆ B ⊆ R. In other words, items that have been submitted to the bulletin board but not
confirmed might or might not appear in B . We retain a level of uncertainty over what is
published, because this level of uncertainty is present in the implementation when some of
the bulletin board peers are untrusted. Furthermore, in the implementation the adversary
can orchestrate further posts and receipts following publication of the bulletin board, so our
specification must reflect this: additional posts can be accepted. Requirement (bb.2) states
that given both a published bulletin board and a receipted item, that item must be on the
bulletin board. To remain consistent with this requirement, any receipts issued in a msg2
after bulletin board publication must be on any published bulletin board. Observe that if
every posting has a receipt, then the bulletin board will contain all posted items (C = R = B).
Observe that a msg3 allows no more than one bulletin board to be published, meeting
requirement (bb.4): once published, the bulletin board is fixed .
The resulting Event-B model is given in Figure 7. This is the specification that we will show
our design meets. The model includes a bulletin board and its environment. As well as
the state of the bulletin board, we include the state EA of the environment, containing the
communications that it is managing, because we will want to consider the bulletin board pro-
tocol design in a model including the Dolev-Yao adversary, which provides an asynchronous
communication medium.
4.2 Implementation: a Robust Bulletin Board Design
The aim of the implementation is that if a threshold of peers behave according to the protocol,
then the implementation will behave as the bulletin board of Section 4 above with receipts and
publication commitment. This allows for a minority of peers to fail, or to behave maliciously,
without impacting on the overall behaviour of the bulletin board. In fact as we shall see, as
long as a post x is handled by some threshold of peers then a receipt can be provided, and
x will appear on the public web bulletin board. Different posts can be handled by different
threshold sets, allowing for individual peers to drop out temporarily (e.g. from a temporary
loss of communication).
There are n peers, numbered 1 to n. Each peer j has its own signing key skj . There is
also a threshold signing key SSK , and each peer j has a share of it: sskj . Any t out of n
partial signatures SSK on a value m can be combined to the corresponding signature on m:
sigSSK (m). The condition on the threshold t is that t > 2n/3.
The design is a slight simplification of that given in [Sur13]. Each peer j maintains its local
database Dj , which initially contains no entries. It also has a boolean variable pubj which is
initially false.
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Figure 8: Posting Protocol
The peers run two protocols. The first is for accepting posts and providing acknowledgements,
and the second is for publishing the bulletin board.
Post and Acknowledge Protocol
This protocol is illustrated in Figure 8, and is a simplication of the full protocol of Figure 1.
It consists of three rounds, as follows:
1. User → Pi : x (for each i ∈ I )
2. Pi → Pj : sigski (x ) (for each i , j ∈ I , j 6= i)
each Pi waits for at least a threshold number of signatures
3. Pi → User : sigsski (x ) (for each i ∈ I )
Publish Protocol
This protocol is illustrated in Figure 9. It is a combination of the pair of protocols given in
Figures 2 and 3, with Round 1 as the fallback protocol and then Round 2 as the optimistic
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WBB Peer1 Peer2 Peer3 Peer4
D1
D2
D4
D3
sigssk1(t(D)) sigssk2(t(D))
sigssk3(t(D))sigssk4(t(D))
Round 1
Round 2
D = D1 ∪D2 ∪D3 ∪D4
(msg5)
(msg6)
Figure 9: Publishing Protocol
protocol, and with the signature on the bulletin board directly. When the time comes to
publish, then the Post and Acknowledge protocol stops and is no longer executed, and the
peer begins the commit protocol which is used for the peers to obtain agreement on the
bulletin board to publish, as follows:
1. Pi → Pj : Di (for each i , j ∈ I , j 6= i)
each Pi adds any missing information received from others to its own database
2. Pi →WBB : sigsski (t(Di)) (for each i ∈ I )
4.3 Event-B Modelling and analysis
The threat model built into the model of the protocol incorporates our robustness considera-
tions, in particular that the correctness of the bulletin board is not dependent on the correct
behaviour of any individual component, as long as a threshold behave correctly. It allows for
the case where peers behave honestly but occasionally are down (either through connection
loss, or through temporary server loss): this is modelled simply by the absence of messages
between DY and the peer, and allows for peers to miss some posts. The model also includes
the case where peers t + 1 to n can lose or otherwise alter their databases of received posts.
However, the honest peers 1 to t do not lose their databases: for correctness we require that
a threshold of peers do not lose their data.
The set MESSAGE of all possible messages m in the model is given as follows:
m ::= k | i | sigk (m) | {m1, . . . ,mn}
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where k ∈ KEY and i ∈ ITEM . Observe that a message can itself consist of a set of messages,
and thus MESSAGE covers all rounds of the protocol. In particular RECEIPT ⊆ MESSAGE
and PUBLISH ⊆ MESSAGE .
Two further definitions will be useful when expressing the model:
SIG1 = {sigskk (x ) | 1 6 k 6 n ∧ x ∈ ITEM }
t(D) = {x | #{k | sigskk (x ) ∈ D} > t}
The set SIG1 is the set of items signed by any of the peers. Given a set D of signed items,
the set t(D) is those items for which D contains a threshold number of different signatures.
If D is used to track the signed items received by a peer, then t(D) is those items fpr which
it has received a threshold number.
We will now define the model. It is declared as follows:
machine BBProt1
refines BBSpec1
variables E , Ij ,Dj , pubj , comj (1 6 j 6 t)
Its invariant is given as follows:
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invariant
/* Types */
E ⊆ MESSAGE
Ij ⊆ ITEM
Dj ⊆ SIG1
pubj ∈ BOOL
comj ∈ BOOL
/* Key invariant properties */
k 6 t ∧ k ∈ c[x ] ∧ k ∈ s[B ]⇒ x ∈ B (1)
sigsskj (x ) ∈ E ⇒ #dj [x ] > t (2)
sigSSK (x ) ∈ E ⇒ #c[x ] > t (3)
sigsskj (B) ∈ E ⇒ B ⊆ t(Dj ) (4)
sigSSK (B) ∈ E ⇒ #s[B ] > t (5)
Dj ⊆ E (6)
k 6 t ∧ k ∈ s[B ]⇒ comk = true (7)
k 6 t ∧ k ∈ s[B1] ∧ B1 6= B2 ⇒ k 6∈ s[B2] (8)
/* adversary bound invariant — see (9)–(11) below
/* Linking invariant — see (12)–(14) of Section 4.4 */
where:
dj [x ] = {k | sigskk (x ) ∈ Dj } shares of part sigs on x received by Peer j
c[x ] = {k | sigsskk (x ) ∈ E} peers which have (part)signed the receipt on x
s[B ] = {k | sigsskk (B) ∈ E} peers which have part-signed bulletin board B
Each event introduced below preserves the invariant: INV is established for each event.
The initialisation and external events are given as follows:
events
init =̂ E := {skk | k > t} ∪ {sskk | k > t} ‖
‖
j
(Ij := {} ‖ Dj := {} ‖ pubj := false ‖ comj := false);
post(x ) =̂ when x ∈ ITEM then E := E ∪ {x} end;
r ←− ack =̂ r :∈ (EA ∩ RECEIPT );
P ←− publish =̂ P :∈ (EA ∩ PUBLISH );
The initial state of each Peer j has Ij = ∅, Dj = ∅, pubj = false and comj = false.
Post and Acknowledge
Recall that Round 2 of the posting protocol involves each peer sending a message to all the
other peers. This is split into two events: c msg2a for the sending of the message (to be held
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by the Dolev-Yao environment), and c msg2b for peers receiving the message. We model
the sending of the message to all peers by sending the message to the environment, and then
allowing all the other peers to receive it.
c msg1: DY → Peer j : x
If ¬pubj , then Peer j inputs the post x . Peer j adds x to its local database of received
items Ij .
c msg1j =̂
any x ∈ E ∩ ITEM ∧ ¬pubj
then Ij := Ij ∪ {x}
end;
c msg2a: Peer j → DY : sigskj (x ) [Peer j to all other peers.]
If ¬pubj , and Ij contains x then Peer j creates sigskj (x ) with its signature key, outputs
it to DY intended for the other peers, and adds it to its local database Dj .
c msg2aj =̂
any x
where x ∈ Ij ∧ ¬pubj
then E := E ∪ {sigskj (x )} ‖ Dj := Dj ∪ {sigskj (x )}
end;
c msg2b: DY → Peer j : sigskk (x ) [Peer j inputting from other peers.]
If ¬pubj , and Peerj inputs sigskk (x ), then Peer j adds sigskk (x ) to Dj .
c msg2bj =̂
any x , k
where sigskk (x ) ∈ E ∧ ¬pubj
then Dj := Dj ∪ {sigskk (x )}
end;
c msg3: Peer j → DY : sigsskj (x )
If ¬pubj , and Dj contains t different signatures on x , then Peer j outputs a signature
share sigsskj (x ).
c msg3j =̂
any x
where x ∈ t(Dj )
then E := E ∪ {sigsskj (x )}
end;
When DY has a threshold number of signature shares sigsskj (x ) on x , DY can combine them
to form the receipt sigSSK (x ), and add this to E . (See event c dy2 below.)
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Commit and Publish
The publish protocol starts by setting pubj to true:
c msg4: Peer j : commitj
c msg4j =̂
when ¬pubj
then pubj := true
end;
Round 1 of the protocol, each peer sending a signature share to all the others, is modelled
by two events: sending, and receiving.
c msg5a: Peer j → DY : Bj [Peer j to all other peers.]
If pubj then Peer j outputs Bj , its local database of signed items, intended for the other
peers. This communicates its local database to the other peers.
c msg5aj =̂
when pubj
then E := E ∪ {Dj }
end;
c msg5b: DY → Peer j : Dk
If pubj then Peer j inputs Dk , k ’s local database Dk . This is added to Dj : any signed
posts sigskk (x ) in Dk that are not already in Dj are added to Dj .
c msg5bj =̂
any D
where D ∈ E ∧ D ⊆ SIG1 ∧ pubj
then Dj := Dj ∪D
end;
c msg6: Peer j → DY : sigsskj (t(Dj ))
If pubj then Peer j can send out a signature share on its current version of the bulletin
board: those items for which it holds a threshold of signatures, t(Dj ).
c msg6j =̂
when pubj ∧ ¬comj
then E := E ∪ {sigsskj (t(Dj ))} ‖ comj := true
end;
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The Dolev-Yao environment
The Dolev-Yao environment is modelled through the use of the set E to retain all messages
that are sent and received by protocol parties. The adversary is also able to generate new
messages to introduce into protocol executions. In particular, he can sign any message with
any key that he possesses; he can combine shares of a signature into a threshold signature;
he can extract the message from a signature; and he can add and remove messages from a
set of messages. These capabilities are captured in the following derivation rules, which show
how a new message can be generated from a set of messages.
{k ,m} ` sigk (m)
#S > t ⇒ {sigsskk (m) | k ∈ S} ` sigSSK (m)
{sigk (m)} ` m
{m,B} ` B ∪ {m}
m ∈ B ⇒ {B} ` m
We model adversary behaviour by including an event for each rule, allowing the adversary to
introduce new events to the set E .
c dy1 =̂ /* signing */
any m, s
where m ∈ E ∧ s ∈ E
then E := E ∪ {sigs(m)}
end;
c dy2 =̂ /* threshold signature on m */
any S ,m
where #S > t ∧ {sigsskk (m) | k ∈ S} ⊆ E
then E := E ∪ {sigSSK (m)}
end;
c dy3 =̂ /* extracting m from signature */
any m, s
where sigs(m) ∈ E
then E := E ∪ {m}
end;
c dy4 =̂ /* adding m to B */
any m,B
where m ∈ E ∧ B ∈ E
then E := E ∪ {B ∪ {m}}
end;
c dy5 =̂ /* extracting m from B */
any m,B
where B ∈ E ∧ m ∈ B
then E := E ∪ {m}
end;
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Some additional clauses are necessary to introduce into the invariant as below, to capture the
limits of what the adversary can introduce. These are necessary for the refinement proof.
/* adversary bound invariant */
E ∩ ({skk | k 6 t} ∪ {sskk | k 6 t}) = ∅ (9)⋃
e∈E
items(e) ⊆ E (10)⋃
e∈E
sigs(e) ⊆ E (11)
where
items(x ) = {x}
items(sigs(x )) = items(x )
items(B) =
⋃
b∈B
items(b)
sigs(x ) = {}
sigs(sigs(x )) = {sigs(x )} ∪ sigs(x )
sigs(B) =
⋃
b∈B
sigs(b)
4.4 Simulation
We aim to establish that the concrete system BBProt1 refines the abstract system BBSpec1
with respect to the external events {post , ack , publish}.
To establish refinement we show that any concrete move can be matched by an abstract
move, or (for events other that post , ack and publish) matched by skip. To do this we need
to identify the linking invariant, the relationship between the abstract and concrete states,
and show that any concrete move from a concrete state is matched for any corresponding
abstract state by some abstract move or skip.
Linking invariant
We thus have to identify when, in the concrete system, abstract events are considered to have
occurred.
• abstract a msg1 occurs when the bulletin board receives x . In the concrete model this
corresponds to t peers having received x and signed it. Since there can be up to n − t
dishonest peers, this means t − (n − t) = 2t − n honest peers having signed x .
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• abstract a msg2 occurs when the bulletin board issues a signature on x . This corre-
sponds to the combining of t returns of signature shares sigsskj (x ).
• abstract a msg3 occurs when a signed database sigSSK (t(D)) is produced. This corre-
sponds to the combining of t returns of signature shares sigsskj (t(D)).
The abstract state sA is the pair of databases R and C , and medium EA.
The concrete state sC is the set of databases Ij , Dj and pubj for the peers, E for the Dolev-Yao
environment.
The linking invariant is given by the following predicate J (sA, sC ):
/* linking invariant */
R = {x ∈ ITEM | #{k | 1 6 k 6 t ∧ sigskk (x ) ∈ E} > 2t − n} (12)
C = {x ∈ ITEM | sigSSK (x ) ∈ E} (13)
EA = E ∩ (ITEM ∪ RECEIPT ∪ PUBLISH ) (14)
R is the set of items for which the adversary (and possibly other peers) can provide a threshold
of sigskj (x ), and so can include x on the published bulletin board. If at least 2t−n honest peers
have signed x , then it is within the adversary’s control to produce a further n − t signatures,
giving a threshold of signatures on x . C is the set of items for which the adversary has a
receipt—evidence that sufficiently many peers have a threshold of sigskj (x ) to ensure that it
will appear on the published bulletin board.
We are now in a position to present the main result: that the concrete model behaves ac-
cording to the abstract model.
Lemma 4.1. BBSpec1 4 BBProt1 with respect to {post , ack , publish}.
Proof Consider each event of BBProt1 in turn. It is necessary to prove GRD INV REF3
in each case. In most cases the event is matched by skip and we establish INV REF2, which
is stronger.
Case post . Matched by post of BBSpec1: the update to E is matched by the update to EA,
preserving the linking invariant.
Case ack . Matched by ack of BBSpec1: the concrete output of receipt r is matched by the
abstract output of receipt r , since if r ∈ E then r ∈ EA by the linking invariant.
Case publish. Matched by publish of BBSpec1: the concrete output of M from E is matched
by the abstract output of M , since if M ∈ E then M ∈ EA by the linking invariant.
Case c msg1. Matched by skip
Case c msg2a. If #{k | 1 6 k 6 t ∧ sigskk (x ) ∈ E} = 2t − n − 1 and #{k | 1 6 k 6 t ∧
sigskk (x ) ∈ E ′} = 2t − n then this event is matched by mA = a msg1 with x . Otherwise
matched by skip.
Case c msg2b. Matched by skip.
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Case c msg3. Matched by skip.
Case c msg4. Matched by skip.
Case c msg5a . Matched by skip.
Case c msg5b . Matched by skip.
Case c msg6. Matched by skip.
Case c dy1. Matched by skip. In particular, R remains unchanged due to invariant (9).
Case c dy2. For variable E , we use E to refer to its value before the occurrence of this
event, and E ′ for its value after its occurrence.
If x ∈ ITEM and sigSSK (x ) 6∈ E and sigSSK (x ) ∈ E ′, then this is matched by a msg2. We
must show that (1) x ∈ R and (2) sigSSK (B) ∈ EA ⇒ x ∈ B .
1. x ∈ R: We have that #c[x ] > t . Hence there is some k 6 t with k ∈ c[x ], so by
invariant (2) it follows that #dk [x ] > t . By invariant (6) it follows that #{k | sigskk (x ) ∈
E} > t , and hence that #({k | sigskk (x ) ∈ E} − {t + 1 . . .n}) > t − (n − t) = 2t − n.
Hence x ∈ R as required.
2. sigSSK (B) ∈ EA ⇒ x ∈ B : Assume sigSSK (B) ∈ EA. Then #s[B ] > t . Also we have
#c(x ) > t , so by Lemma 3.1 there is some k 6 t with k ∈ c[x ] and k ∈ s[B ]. Hence
from (1) it follows that x ∈ B as required.
If BC ⊆ ITEM and sigSSK (BC ) 6∈ E and sigSSK (BC ) ∈ E ′, then this is matched by a msg3,
with B = BC . We must show that (1) EA ∩ PUBLISH = {}, (2) C ⊆ BC and (3) BC ⊆ R.
1. EA ∩ PUBLISH = {}: we establish this by contradiction. If sigSSK (B) ∈ EA for some
B 6= BC , then #s[B ] > t by (5). Also we have s[BC ] > t by the guard of c dy2. Hence
from Lemma 3.1 there is some k 6 t with k ∈ s[B ] and k ∈ s[BC ], contradicting (8).
2. C ⊆ BC : consider some x ∈ C . Then sigSSK (x ) ∈ E , so #c[x ] > t by invariant (3).
Further, #s[BC ] > t by invariant (5). Hence from Lemma 3.1 there is some k 6 t with
k ∈ c[x ] and k ∈ s[BC ]. Hence by invariant (1), x ∈ BC , as required.
3. BC ⊆ R: We have from invariant (3) that sigsskj (BC ) ∈ E for some j 6 t . Now
consider x ∈ BC . Then x ∈ t(Dj ) by invariant (4). Hence x ∈ t(E ) by invariant (6),
and so #{k | 1 6 k 6 n ∧ skk (x ) ∈ E} > t from the definition of t(E ), and hence
#{k | 1 6 k 6 t ∧ skk (x ) ∈ E} > 2t − n. Thus x ∈ R as required.
Otherwise c dy2 is matched by skip.
Case c dy3. Matched by skip, since EA = E ∩ (ITEM ∪ RECEIPT ∪ PUBLISH ) does not
change, by invariants (10) and (11).
Case c dy4. Matched by skip.
Case c dy5. Matched by skip, since any items, receipts or publish messages in B are already
in E by invariants (10) and (11).
This concludes the proof that BBSpec1 4 BBProt1 with respect to {post , ack , publish}, es-
tablishing the correctness of the bulletin board protocol BBProt1 against the specification
BBSpec1.
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4.5 Example attacks on weaker versions
Example 4.1. In order to see the necessity for the round of signed messages in the posting
and acknowledgement protocol (message 2), we consider what can occur if this round is not
included. In particular, if peers simply receive posts and respond with their signature share
towards the receipt, then an adversary can organise for a receipt to be provided for an item
not on the bulletin board, as follows:
x
User Peer1 Peer2 Peer3 E:Peer4
sigssk1(x )
sigssk2(x )
sigssk4(x )
x
x
sigSSK (x )
construct
WBB
discard x
x in some form
x in some form
not enough
Post x
Construct
Bulletin
Board
Peer4
shares of x
to include
on WBB
Here Peer 3 is cut out of the posting and acknowledgement protocol on a submission x , but
a threshold of peers provide a signature share and so a receipt is provided. However, peer 4
is dishonest, and so discards x before publication of the bulletin board. Hence there are only
two shares of x recorded, insufficient to warrant inclusion on the published bulletin board.
Example 4.2. This example illustrates the necessity for the threshold to be greater than
2n/3. If the threshold is 2n/3 or less, then an adversary can arrange for a receipt to be issued
on an item not included on the bulletin board, as follows:
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User Peer1 Peer2 E:Peer3
sigssk1(x )
sigssk3(x )
x
x
sigSSK (x )
construct
WBB
discard x
sigssk1(t(D1))
Post x
Construct
Bulletin
Board
Peer3
sigssk2(t(D2))
sigssk3(t(D2))
t(D2) accepted
x 6∈ R2
sigsk3(x )
sigsk1(x )
In this attack a receipt can be provided on a post x although it does not appear on the board.
Peer 2 is excluded from the posting and acknowledgement of x , however participation from
Peers 1 and 3 is sufficient to provide a receipt. Peer 3 (which is dishonest) then discards x .
When the bulletin board is published, Peer 1 is excluded from the publication protocol, but
Peers 2 and 3 agree on a bulletin board not including x , and so that is published. The attack
works because there is no honest peer that has participated in both the acknowledgement of
x and its posting on the bulletin board. The attack cannot happen if the threshold is strictly
greater than 2n/3, because in that case there must be some honest peer contributing to both
the receipt on x and the agreed bulletin board, which is enough to ensure that x is included
on the bulletin board.
5 Multiple Bulletin Board Rounds
We extend to the case where multiple bulletin boards can be published. We consider a period
p to consist of a number of posts followed by publication of the associated bulletin board
for that period. Thus different bulletin boards can be published for different periods, and
we require that every period’s bulletin board will behave according to the bulletin board
specification given in BBSpec1.
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5.1 Specification
The specification of multiple bulletin boards is of a collection of boards that each behave
according to specification BBSpec1. This is captured as an indexed collection of bulletin
boards within a single specification BBSpec2. Receipts will be issued with the index of the
bulletin board the item has been posted to, and a bulletin board will be published with its
index. We define
RECEIPT2 = {sigSSK (p, x ) | x ∈ ITEM ∧ p ∈ N}
PUBLISH 2 = {sigSSK (p,B) | B ⊆ ITEM ∧ p ∈ N}
PUBLISH 2p = {sigSSK (p,B) | B ⊆ ITEM }
machine BBSpec2
variables EA,Rp ,Cp (p ∈ N)
invariant EA ⊆ ITEM ∪ RECEIPT2 ∪ PUBLISH 2
Rp ⊆ ITEM (p ∈ N)
Cp ⊆ ITEM (p ∈ N)
events
init =̂ EA := {} ‖ ‖p∈N(Rp := {} ‖ Cp := {})
post(x ) =̂ when x ∈ ITEM then EA := EA ∪ {x} end;
r ←− ack =̂ r :∈ (EA ∩ RECEIPT2);
P ←− publish =̂ P :∈ (EA ∩ PUBLISH 2);
a msg1 =̂
any x ∈ EA ∩ ITEM ∧ p ∈ N
then Rp := Rp ∪ {x}
end;
a msg2 =̂
any x , p
where x ∈ Rp ∧ (sigSSK (p,B) ∈ EA ⇒ x ∈ B)
then EA := EA ∪ {sigSSK (p, x )} ‖ Cp := Cp ∪ {x}
end;
a msg3 =̂
any Y , p
where Cp ⊆ Y ⊆ Rp ∧ EA ∩ PUBLISH 2p = {}
then EA := EA ∪ {sigSSK (p,Y )}
end
end
5.2 Implementation
In the implementation, each peer maintains a counter pj which it uses to track the period it is
currently accepting posts for. The counter will be incremented when it has finished accepting
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posts for one period and begins accepting posts for the next. It also maintains a separate
state space for each period. For example, where BBProt1 used Rj for j ’s record of what it
had received, BBProt2 will use Rj ,p for j ’s record of what it received in period p, and so will
have a separate set for each period.
The resulting model BBProt2 is given in the various clauses below. The model is shown in
the events within the description. The key to the refinement proof is that the interleaving
of the events across the different periods do not interfere, even though peers can progress
their periods independently and can be involved in publication of one bulletin board while
receiving items for another.
Declaration and Invariant
SIG1p = {sigSSK (p, x ) | x ∈ ITEM }
machine BBProt2
refines BBSpec2
variables E , Ij ,p , Dj ,p , pj (1 6 j 6 t)
invariant
/* Types */
E ⊆ MESSAGE
Ij ,p ⊆ ITEM
Dj ,p ⊆ {sigskk (p, x ) | x ∈ ITEM }
pj ∈ N
/* Key invariant properties */
k 6 t ∧ k ∈ c[p, x ] ∧ k ∈ s[p,B ]⇒ x ∈ B
sigsskj (p, x ) ∈ E ⇒ #dj [p, x ] > t
sigSSK (p, x ) ∈ E ⇒ #c[p, x ] > t
sigsskj (p,B) ∈ E ⇒ B ⊆ t(Dj ,p)
sigSSK (p,B) ∈ E ⇒ #s[p,B ] > t
Dj ,p ⊆ E
k 6 t ∧ k ∈ s[p,B ]⇒ ck > p
k 6 t ∧ k ∈ s[p,B1] ∧ B1 6= B2 ⇒ k 6∈ s[p,B2]
/* linking invariant */
Rp = {x ∈ ITEM | #{k | 1 6 k 6 t ∧ sigskk (p, x ) ∈ E} > 2t − n}
Cp = {x ∈ ITEM | sigSSK (p, x ) ∈ E}
EA = E ∩ (ITEM ∪ RECEIPT2 ∪ PUBLISH 2)
where:
dj [p, x ] = {k | sigskk (p, x ) ∈ Dj } shares of part sigs on x received by Peer j
c[p, x ] = {k | sigsskk (p, x ) ∈ E} peers which have (part)signed the receipt on x
s[p,B ] = {k | sigsskk (p,B) ∈ E} peers which have part-signed bulletin board B
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External events
External events look very similar in BBProt2.
events
init =̂ E := {skk | k > t} ∪ {sskk | k > t} ‖
‖
j ,n
(Ij ,n := {} ‖ Dj ,n := {} ‖ pj := 0 ‖ cj := 0);
post(x ) =̂ when x ∈ ITEM then E := E ∪ {x} end;
r ←− ack =̂ r :∈ (E ∩ RECEIPT2);
P ←− publish =̂ P :∈ E ∩ PUBLISH 2;
Posting and acknowledgement protocol
Posting and acknowledgement is similar. The new aspect is the introduction of the period
pj , and Peerj may only accept and acknowledge items, and issue its share of the receipt, for
items in its current period.
c msg1j (x ) =̂ /* receive item x */
when x ∈ E ∩ ITEM
then Ij ,pj := Ij ,pj ∪ {x}
end;
c msg2aj =̂ /* send signature share on x */
any x
where x ∈ Ij ,pj
then E := E ∪ {sigskj (pj , x )} ‖ Dj ,pj := Dj ,pj ∪ {sigskj (pj , x )}
end;
c msg2bj =̂ /* receive signature share on x */
any x , k
where sigskk (pj , x ) ∈ E
then Dj ,pj := Dj ,pj ∪ {sigskk (pj , x )}
end;
c msg3j =̂ /* send signature share on receipt of x */
any x
where x ∈ t(Dj ,pj )
then E := E ∪ {sigsskj (pj , x )}
end;
Commit and publish protocol
The commit protocol for the bulletin board of period pj is started by incrementing pj . Thus
no further posts will be accepted for that bulletin board, and the events in the commit and
publish protocol are then enabled. They match the events from BBProt1.
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c msg4j =̂ /* start commit protocol */
begin
pj := pj + 1
end;
c msg5aj =̂ /* send database */
any p < pj
then E := E ∪ {Dj ,p}
end;
c msg5bj =̂ /* receive k ’s database, update Dj ,p if necesssary */
any D , p
where D ∈ E ∧ D ⊆ SIG1p ∧ p < pj
then Dj ,p := Dj ,p ∪D
end;
c msg6j =̂ /* publish signature share on t(Dj ,p) */
when cj < pj
then E := E ∪ {sigsskj (cj , t(Dj ,cj ))} ‖ cj := cj + 1
end;
Dolev-Yao environment
The adversary has the same moves as before, with two new ones, combining and separating
pairs. This arises from the introduction of pairing in this model, to allow the period along
with the message to be signed.
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c dy1 =̂ /* signature share on m */
any m, s
where m ∈ E ∧ s ∈ E
then E := E ∪ {sigs(m)}
end;
c dy2 =̂ /* threshold signature on m */
any S ,m
where #S > t ∧ {sigsskk (m) | k ∈ S} ⊆ E
then E := E ∪ {sigSSK (m)}
end;
c dy3 =̂ /* extracting m from signature */
any m, s
where sigs(m) ∈ E
then E := E ∪ {m}
end;
c dy4 =̂ /* adding m to B */
any m,B
where m ∈ E ∧ B ∈ E
then E := E ∪ {B ∪ {m}}
end;
c dy5 =̂ /* extracting m from B */
any m,B
where B ∈ E ∧ m ∈ B
then E := E ∪ {m}
end;
c dy6 =̂ /* pairing */
any m, p
where m ∈ E ∧ p ∈ N
then E := E ∪ {(p,m)}
end;
c dy7 =̂ /* splitting */
any m, p
where (p,m) ∈ E
then E := E ∪ {p,m}
end
5.3 Simulation
Establishing the simulation relation follows the structure of the proof that BBProt1 refines
BBSpec1. BBProt2 essentially consists of an indexed collection of BBProt1 bulletin boards.
Each peer j maintains a counter pj indicating its current bulletin board. The bulletin board
indexed by p has p < pj in place of pubj : Peer j enters the publication phase for bulletin
board p once the counter pj has progressed beyond p. It also has p < cj in place of comj :
Peer j has commited to its share once the counter cj has progressed beyond p.
Thus we obtain:
Lemma 5.1. BBSpec2 4 BBProt2 with respect to {post , ack , publish}
Proof (sketch)
We need to prove that if J (sA, sC ), and sC
mC−→ s ′C then either J (sA, s ′C ) (mc is matched by
skip), or ∃mA, s ′A such that sA
mA−→ s ′A and J (s ′A, s ′C ) (mc is matched by mA).
The proof of each case for mC follows the same case in the proof of Lemma 4.1, where p < pj
takes the place of pubj . We show two example cases: c msg2a and c dy2
Case c msg2a. Peer j → DY : sigskj (pj , x ). If #{k | 1 6 k 6 t ∧ sigskk (pj , x ) ∈ E} =
2t −n−1 and #{k | 1 6 k 6 t ∧ sigskk (pj , x ) ∈ E ′} = 2t −n then matched by mA = a msg1
for x , pj . Otherwise matched by skip.
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Case c dy2. If x ∈ ITEM and sigSSK (p, x ) 6∈ E and sigSSK (p, x ) ∈ E ′, then this is matched
by a msg2. It remains to show that x ∈ Rp and sigSSK (p,B) ∈ EA ⇒ x ∈ B . The proof
follows that of the same case in Lemma 4.1.
If BC ⊆ ITEM and sigSSK (p,BC ) 6∈ E and sigSSK (p,BC ) ∈ E ′, then this is matched by
a msg3, with Y = BC . The proof that (1) EA ∩ PUBLISHp = {}, (2) Cp ⊆ Y and (3)
Y ⊆ Rp , for Y = BC } is entirely similar to this case in the proof of Lemma 4.1.
Otherwise matched by skip.
The other cases follow the same pattern.
This concludes the proof that BBSpec2 4 BBProt2 with respect to {post , ack , publish}.
6 Accepting and Rejecting Posts
We now augment the Bulletin Board with an additional feature required for our use with Preˆt
a` Voter: the ability to reject posts if they conflict with posts already received. For example,
different votes cannot be accepted on the same ballot, and audit requests cannot be accepted
(even on different boards) after a vote has been cast.
In particular, the bulletin board may refuse posts if they are inconsistent with previously
accepted posts. We express this by introducing an irreflexive symmetric binary relation clash
such that clash(x , x ′) captures when two items x and x ′ should not both appear on the
bulletin board. For convenience we define clashset(x ) = {x ′ | clash(x , x ′)} to be the set of all
events that clash with x .
We will require that x will be accepted if there is no x ′ already received on any of the bulletin
boards which clashes with x : in other words, that clashset(x ) ∩ (⋃p Rp) = {}.
For example, in our context if x is a vote on a ballot then clashset(x ) will be the set of audits
and other votes on that ballot. If x is an audit on a ballot then clashset(x ) will be the set
of all possible votes on that ballot. If c is a cancellation of a ballot then clashset(x ) = ∅: a
cancellation can always be added to the bulletin board.
6.1 Specification
The specification is obtained by simply strengthening the guard in BBSpec2 of the event
a msg1 to include the non-clashing requirement. All other events are identical to those in
BBSpec2. This yields the machine BBSpec3 as follows:
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machine BBSpec3
variables EA,Rp ,Cp (p ∈ N)
...
a msg1 =̂
any x , p
where x ∈ EA ∩ ITEM ∧ p ∈ N ∧ clashset(x ) ∩ (
⋃
p Rp) = {}
then Rp := Rp ∪ {x}
end;
...
end
6.2 Implementation
We already have that WBBProt2 is already a refinement of BBSpec2. Hence to obtain a
refinement of BBSpec3 it is enough to strengthen the guards of the events in WBBProt2
matched by a msg1, to ensure that when they are enabled then so is a msg1. In order to
complete the refinement proof we also need to strengthen the invariant with clauses 15 and
16 below.
In fact the only event matched by a msg1 in the proof of Lemma 4.1 is c msg2a. We will
thus obtain machine WBBProt3 from WBBProt2 by strengthening c msg2a as follows:
c msg2aj =̂
any x
where x ∈ Ij ,pj ∧ clashset(x ) ∩ {y | skj (p, y) ∈
⋃
p Dj ,p} = {}
then E := E ∪ {sigskj (pj , x )} ‖ Dj ,pj := Dj ,pj ∪ {sigskj (pj , x )}
end;
We also require two more clauses in the invariant of WBBProt3. It is straightforward to
establish that all of the events of WBBProt3 preserve these additional clauses:
sigskj (p, x ) ∈ E ⇔ sigskj (p, x ) ∈ Dj ,p (15)
clash(x , x ′) ∧ sigskj (p, x ) ∈ Dj ,p ⇒ sigskj (p′, x ′) 6∈ (
⋃
p
Dj ,p) (16)
6.3 Simulation
With the exception of a msg1 and c msg2a, all events in WBBSpec3 and WBBProt3 are
exactly the same as in BBSpec2 and WBBProt2, and so the refinements established previously
remain valid.
We therefore only one new case to consider: c msg2a:
33
Case c msg2a. If (1) #{k 6 t | sigskk (pj , x ) ∈ E} = 2t − n − 1 and sigskj (pj , x ) 6∈ E and
clashset(x ) ∩ {y | skj (p, y) ∈
⋃
p Dj ,p} = {} then this move will be matched by a msg1.
Otherwise (2) c msg2a is matched by skip and we are done.
Hence for (1) it remains to prove that the guard of a msg1 is enabled in this case, i.e. that
clashset(x ) ∩ (⋃p Rp) = {}. Since J (sA, sC ) this means that we must prove that in state sC
there is no x ′ ∈ clashset(x ) such that x ′ ∈ ⋃p Rp , i.e. no x ′ such that #{k 6 t | sigskk (p′, x ′) ∈
E} > 2t − n.
We establish this by contraction. Assume there is some x ′ such that clash(x , x ′) and #{k 6
t | sigskk (p ′, x ′) ∈ E} > 2t − n in state sC . This will also be the case in s ′C . Also in state
s ′C we have #{k 6 t | sigskk (pj , x ) ∈ E} = 2t − n. Hence by Corollary 3.2 there is some
k < t such that sigskk (p
′, x ′) ∈ E and sigskk (pj , x ) ∈ E . Hence by invariant (15) we have
sigskk (p
′, x ′) ∈ Dk ′ and sigskk (pj , x ) ∈ Dk ,pj . This yields a contradiction with invariant (16),
since clash(x , x ′).
We thus conclude that the guard of a msg1 is enabled, and the refinement follows.
It follows that BBSpec3 4 BBProt3 with respect to {post , ack , publish}.
6.4 Example: lower threshold allows acceptance of clashing posts
Example 6.1. This example provides a second illustration as to why the threshold of honest
peers is required to be greater than 2n/3. If it is not, then an adversary can arrange for
receipts to be issued on clashing posts, as shown:
34
User Peer1 Peer2 E:Peer3
sigssk1(p, x )
sigssk3(p, x )
x
x
sigSSK (p, x )
construct
Post x
sigsk3(p, x )
sigsk1(p, x )
y
y
sigsk3(p, y)
sigsk2(p, y)
sigssk2(p, y)
sigssk3(p, y)
Post y
construct
sigSSK (p, y)
In this attack two conflicting posts, x and y , are both provided with receipts. This is possible
because no honest peer in involved in both: Peer 1 and (dishonest) Peer 3 contribute to the
receipt of x , and Peers 2 and 3 contribute to the receipt of y . However, the WBB should
only accept at most one of x and y . The attack is possible because Peer 3 provides shares
towards the receipts of both x and y , something no honest peer would do. If the threshold
of honest peers is greater than 2n/3 then the same attack would require an honest peer to
accept both x and y , which the protocol prevents.
7 Optimistic Commitment and Fallback
The final element of the bulletin board to introduce is the optimistic protocol within the
publication phase, and the use of signed hashes in publication of the bulletin board.
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Publication
When the time comes to publish, then the Post and Acknowledge protocol stops, and the peer
begins the commit protocol which is used for the peers to obtain agreement on the bulletin
board to publish.
Earlier models have used a round of message exchanges where peers circulate their database
Dj , and another round where they circulate part-signed copies of their version of the bulletin
board t(Dj ). In the case where there is some disagreement on databases then peers can
update their bulletin boards to include new items they have received.
In practice we hope that in most cases the peers will agree on their local databases, and in
this case they do not need to circulate them. We therefore introduce an optimistic commit
where they can simply circulate a partially signed hash of their bulletin board (together with
the period p): if they agree on the hash then they combine to give a threshold signature, and
any peer can publish the bulletin board with the signed hash. If they do not agree then they
can fall back to circulating their databases.
We therefore replace event c msg6 by two messages: one to circulate a part-signed hash of
the bulletin board sigsskj (h(t(Dj ))), and one to circulate the bulleting board t(Dj ) itself (since
this cannot be retrieved from the hash). The reason for separating these into two events is
that we will eventually wish to schedule them separately: circulation of the hash will happen
in the optimistic round, whereas publication of the board itself need not occur until there is
agreement on the hash.
Optimistic commit protocol: This consists of two rounds:
1. Pi → Pj : sigski (p, h(Bi ,p)) (for each i , j ∈ I , j 6= i)
each Pi checks the hashes from all peers agree
2. Pi →WBB : Bi ,p , sigsski (p, h(Bi ,p)) (for each i ∈ I )
If there are not a threshold number of matching messages then the Fallback commit
protocol is run:
Fallback commit protocol: This consists of a round of communications in which the peers
exchange their databases in order to make them consistent.
1. Pi → Pj : Di ,p (for each i , j ∈ I , j 6= i)
Peer j receives Di ,p from each of the other peers, up to some timeout. For each D
received, Peer j adds to Dj ,p any item sigskk (p, x ) ∈ D that is not already in Dj ,p .
The peers then return to the optimistic commit protocol.
7.1 Specification
The specification BBSpec4 is similar to BBSpec3 except that the form of the published bulletin
board is changed, so that the unsigned bulletin board is published together with a signed
hash. Events a msg2 and a msg3 are updated to reflect the change to the form in which
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bulletin boards are published, and publish is also updated to output the new form of bulletin
board.
RECEIPT4 = RECEIPT2
PUBLISH 4 = {sigSSK (p, h(Y )) | p ∈ N ∧ Y ⊆ ITEM }
PUBLISH 4p = {sigSSK (p, h(Y )) | Y ⊆ ITEM }
machine BBSpec4
variables EA,Rp ,Cp (p ∈ N)
invariant EA ⊆ ITEM ∪ RECEIPT4 ∪ PUBLISH 4
Rp ⊆ ITEM (p ∈ N)
Cp ⊆ ITEM (p ∈ N)
events
init =̂ EA := {} ‖ ‖p∈N(Rp := {} ‖ Cp := {})
post(x ) =̂ when x ∈ ITEM then EA := EA ∪ {x} end;
r ←− ack =̂ r :∈ (EA ∩ RECEIPT4);
P ←− publish =̂
any Y , p
where Y ⊆ ITEM ∧ sigSSK (p, h(Y )) ∈ EA
then P := (Y , sigSSK (p, h(Y )))
end;
a msg1 =̂
any x ∈ EA ∩ ITEM ∧ p ∈ N
then Rp := Rp ∪ {x}
end;
a msg2 =̂
any x , p
where x ∈ Rp ∧ (sigSSK (p, h(B)) ∈ EA ⇒ x ∈ B)
then EA := EA ∪ {sigSSK (p, x )} ‖ Cp := Cp ∪ {x}
end;
a msg3 =̂
any Y , p
where Cp ⊆ Y ⊆ Rp ∧ EA ∩ PUBLISH4 = {}
then EA := EA ∪ {sigSSK (p, h(Y ))}
end
end
7.2 Implementation
Shared signatures on the bulletin board are now on its hash value. The effects of this change
is highlighted in the invariant below. The remaining clauses remain the same as in BBProt3.
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machine BBProt4
refines BBSpec4
variables E , Ij ,p , Dj ,p , Hj ,p , pj (1 6 j 6 t)
invariant
/* Types */
pj ∈ N
E ⊆ MESSAGE
Ij ,p ⊆ ITEM
Dj ,p ⊆ {sigskk (p, x ) | x ∈ ITEM }
Hj ,p ⊆ {sigskk (p, h(B)) | B ⊆ ITEM }
/* Key invariant properties */
k 6 t ∧ k ∈ c[p, x ] ∧ k ∈ s[p,B ]⇒ x ∈ B
sigsskj (p, x ) ∈ E ⇒ #dj [p, x ] > t
sigSSK (p, x ) ∈ E ⇒ #c[p, x ] > t
sigsskj (p, h(B)) ∈ E ⇒ B ⊆ t(Dj ,p)
sigSSK (p, h(B)) ∈ E ⇒ #s[p,B ] > t
Dj ,p ⊆ E
k 6 t ∧ k ∈ s[p,B ]⇒ ck > p
k 6 t ∧ k ∈ s[p,B1] ∧ B1 6= B2 ⇒ k 6∈ s[p,B2]
/* linking invariant */
Rp = {x ∈ ITEM | #{k | 1 6 k 6 t ∧ sigskk (p, x ) ∈ E} > 2t − n}
Cp = {x ∈ ITEM | sigSSK (p, x ) ∈ E}
EA = E ∩ (ITEM ∪ RECEIPT4 ∪ PUBLISH 4)
where:
dj [p, x ] = {k | sigskk (p, x ) ∈ Dj } shares of part sigs on x received by Peer j
c[p, x ] = {k | sigsskk (p, x ) ∈ E} peers which have (part)signed the receipt on x
s[p,B ] = {k | sigsskk (p, h(B)) ∈ E} peers which have part-signed bulletin board B
External events
External events are very similar in BBProt4. The event publish is adjusted to reflect the new
form of publication, but external evetns are otherwise the same as in BBProt3.
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events
init =̂ E := {skk | k > t} ∪ {sskk | k > t} ‖
‖
j ,n
(Ij ,n := {} ‖ Dj ,n := {} ‖ Hj ,n := {} ‖ pj := 0 ‖ cj := 0);
post(x ) =̂ when x ∈ ITEM then E := E ∪ {x} end;
r ←− ack =̂ r :∈ (E ∩ RECEIPT4);
P ←− publish =̂
any Y , p
where Y ⊆ ITEM ∧ Y ∈ E ∧ sigSSK (p, h(Y )) ∈ E
then P := (Y , sigSSK (p, h(Y )))
end;
Posting and acknowledgement protocol
Posting and acknowledgement is identical to BBProt3, and so we do not reproduce the events
here.
Commit and publish protocol
Agreeing and publishing the bulletin board now has two additional events: sending the
bulletin board explicitly in c msg7, and circulating signed hashes in the optimistic phase
c msg8. Note that c msg6 now provides a partially signed hash rather than a partially
signed bulletin board.
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c msg4j =̂ /* start commit protocol */
begin
pj := pj + 1
end;
c msg5aj =̂ /* send database */
any p < pj
then E := E ∪ {Dj ,p}
end;
c msg5bj =̂ /* receive database */
any D , p
where D ∈ E ∧ D ⊆ SIG1p ∧ p < pj
then Dj ,p := Dj ,p ∪D
end;
c msg6j =̂ /* provide partially signed hash */
when cj < pj ∧ #{k | sigskk (cj , h(t(Dj ,cj )) ∈ Hj ,cj } > t
then E := E ∪ {sigsskj (cj , h(t(Dj ,cj )))} ‖ cj := cj + 1
end;
c msg7j =̂ /* send bulletin board */
any p < pj
then E := E ∪ {t(Dj ,p)}
end;
c msg8aj =̂ /* send signed hash */
any p < pj
then E := E ∪ {sigskj (p, h(t(Dj ,p)))}
end;
c msg8bj =̂ /* receive signed hash */
any p < pj ∧ k 6 n ∧ B ⊆ ITEM ∧ sigskk (p, h(B)) ∈ E
then Hj ,p := Hj ,p ∪ {sigskk (p, h(B))}
end;
Dolev-Yao environment
The adversary has the same moves as before, with one additional one: hashing. Any message
can be hashed.
c dy8 =̂ /* hashing */
any m
where m ∈ E
then E := E ∪ {h(m)}
end
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7.3 Simulation
The proof of simulation follows exactly the pattern of previous proofs. In particular:
• The external events post , ack and publish of BBSpec4 are refined by their counterparts
in BBSpec4.
• Event a msg1 is refined by the appropriate occurrence of c msg2a.
• Events a msg2 and a msg3 are refined by c dy2 combining the signature shares ap-
propriate to each case.
• All other concrete events refine skip. In particular, the new events of the optimistic
protocol c msg7 and c msg8 refine skip.
This concludes the proof that BBSpec4 4 BBProt4 with respect to {post , ack , publish}, es-
tablishing the correctness of the bulletin board protocol BBProt4 against the specification
BBSpec4.
8 Liveness
The Dolev-Yao threat model does not allow the protocol to provide any liveness guarantees.
All communications between the parties involved in the protocols can be blocked, prevent-
ing protocols from completing. The threat model is appropriate for consideration of safety
properties, but is too strong for analysis of liveness. We require some assumptions about
the communications between the protocol participants, as well as their honesty, in order to
consider liveness.
We are primarily concerned with liveness for the publication of the bulletin board at the
end of each period. To reason about liveness we assume that communication between peers
is reliable, but that some of the peers may not follow the protocol, either because they are
dishonest, or because they have failed.
8.1 All honest peers
We consider the case where all bulletin board peers are honest and follow the protocol. This
scenario includes the case where users may be dishonest, sending different information to
different peers, or not involving peers in some posting rounds. It also allows for the possibility
where peers have not synchronised perfectly on the end of the period, so some posted items
may be received in different periods for different peers, and hence their local records of the
bulletin boards will not match.
Liveness can be shown for the commit and publish protocol. Different peers may begin
that protocol with different databases Di from the postings in the period. The optimistic
protocol may complete if enough of them agree on t(Di), the contents of the bulletin board.
However, it might not complete if the peers have sufficiently different records of what the
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bulletin board should contain. In that case all peers execute the fallback protocol, and so
communicate their databases reliably to all other peers. This results in all peers ending up
with the same database record of posted items (i.e. the union of all their databases), and
thus the second execution of the optimistic protocol will succeed in generating a threshold
signature on the bulletin board.
8.2 A threshold of honest peers, and honest users
We now consider the case where some peers are not in communication for the commit and
publish protocol. However we assume a threshold are behaving correctly and communicating
with one another.
If every post of an item during the posting phase involved a threshold of (not necessarily
the same) peers and obtained a receipt, then a single round of the fallback phase will ensure
that all posted items are now obtained by all of the live peers. They are all sharing their
evidence, and for each post there is at least one honest peer who is live in the commit and
publish phase and also participated in the receipt of that item. This peer will provide the
evidence of receipt to the other peers in the fallback round. Hence they will all agree on all
posted items in the subsequent optimistic round. In this case again only one fallback round
is required before agreement was obtained.
8.3 A threshold of honest peers
We now consider the more general case, where only a threshold set of peers are honest and
connected during the publication phase. All peers will fix on a database Di when they enter
the publication phase: honest peers will use the Di corresponding to the item posts they have
received in the period, and we allow that dishonest peers will select any arbitrary Di within
their capability. We assume that peers will not change their database once it has been fixed,
and will not send different databases to different peers, since this form of dishonesty would
be easy to detect in practice. If it is detected then the dishonest peer would be removed and
the protocol re-run (corresponding to a complete failure of that peer). Thus the only failure
we need consider for peers outside the threshold set is failure to communicate, known as a
stopping failure.
With this form of failure the Floodset agreement algorithm [Lyn96, 6.2] will lead to all honest
peers agreeing on a database, and hence a bulletin board, within a maximum of n − t + 1
rounds. Each round of the Floodset algorithm is essentially the fallback protocol, with the
optimistic protocol checking after each round whether there is a consensus. In the context of
our commit and publish protocol the peers are looking for agreement on the union of their
values rather than on one particular value, and so take their agreed value to be that set.
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9 Discussion
9.1 Summary
In this paper we have presented a distributed protocol for running a bulletin board using
a number of peers, which can tolerate a number of them failing, in the context of a threat
model which has the communication between the peers controlled by a Dolev-Yao adversary,
who also is able to control some of the peers. This provides robustness and distributed trust:
the bulletin board can tolerate some peers failing, and we require that a threshold of peers
should be honest but no individual peer is required to be trusted. Provided a threshold of the
peers behave according to the protocol, the key properties demanded of the bulletin board
hold. In particular, only items posted to the bulletin board will be posted on it, any item
whose receipt is acknowledged by the bulletin board must be posted on it, and the bulletin
board will not accept conflicting items. The bulletin board protocol has also been shown
to be live when a threshold of honest peers all communicate without interference with each
other, even if some dishonest peers attempt to disrupt progress.
The development of this modelling and verification approach for this kind of protocol is
also one of the contributions of this paper. Correctness has been established formally using
the Event-B framework, using simulation to show that the protocol is a refinement of an
idealised bulletin board which has the desired properties. The model included a Dolev-Yao
attacker and the description of the protocol steps followed by the peers. Carrying out the
proof identified some nondeterminism inherent in the protocol and enabled us to include it
in the idealisation to document the possible behaviour of the implementation. In particular,
an adversary can create a situation where he controls whether or not an unreceipted item
appears on the bulletin board, and so this is reflected as nondeterminism at the abstract
level. In the context of the vVote system this will not be an issue in practice since the voting
ceremony requires that any unreceipted items should be cancelled. Hence the nondeterminism
will not affect the tallying of the election: either the cancellation appears alongside a vote,
or it appears without the vote.
9.2 Related work
Other proposals for bulletin board implementations using a set of peers are given by Krum-
menacher [Kru10], by Peters [Pet05], and in the STAR-VOTE system [BBB+13].
Krummenacher’s Bulletin Board
Krummenacher focuses on a peered bulletin board that guarantees the correctness of its
history and the authenticity of the messages. His proposal is motivated by the desire to
provide a distributed version of Heather and Lundin’s append-only web bulletin board [HL08].
The protocol is designed essentially for robustness, and is considered in the context where up
to k out of n peers may fail. A particular number of peers (k + 1) must accept an item for it
to be allowed onto the bulletin board. Peers hold their own versions of the history of items
posted, and so their histories would need to be combined in order to obtain the global bulletin
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board. A similarity with our approach is the need for peers to confirm that other peers have
received an item before providing their own response. However, peers use a locking protocol
when they seek confirmation from other peers, so the approach does not scale up well as k
gets larger relative to n.
The most significant difference with the approach of this paper is the threat model: Krum-
menacher considers the protocol in the context of communication failures and peer failures,
but does not consider an active adversary or corrupt peers who might deliberately intro-
duce invalid messages (or accept clashing items). Formal modelling and analysis would help
to clarify the adversarial context and identify whether the protocol does indeed guarantee
correct behaviour within that threat model. Another difference is that Krummenacher’s bul-
letin board is not concerned with preventing clashing items from being posted. This might
be addressed by setting the threshold k to be sufficiently high and requiring that individual
peers do not accept items that clash. If peers can be dishonest then we may require the
threshold of k > 2n/3, but this threshold does not work well with the locking protocol used
in posting. Finally, we also observe that the protocol follows the approach of [HL08] in using
timestamps to ensure that the bulletin board is relatively recent, and hence that no commit
round is required. Instead the peers are always able to provide their current version of the
bulletin board. This approach gives rise to challenges in implementation, notably that a
single view of the ‘official’ bulletin board, as would be required in an election context, would
need to be constantly refreshed by the bulletin board peers. This would be a substantial
overhead, and furthermore its security implications are not well understood. For all these
reasons Krummenacher’s implementation is not suitable as it stands for our requirements.
Peters’ Bulletin Board
Peters [Pet05] considers several approachs, and proposes and implements a bulletin board
which uses a secure agreement protocol [Rei94] on top of a group membership protocol [Rei96].
Items are posted by a client to a single peer, which then communicates with the others, obtains
confirmation of receipt from a threshold of them, circulates that confirmation back to the
peers, and returns a receipt to the client. This approach is similar to our posting protocol,
where peers require confirmation of receipt from a threshold of other peers, before returning
their share of the signature on the receipt. The system requires the same threshold as we
do: that strictly more than 2/3 of the peers behave honestly. Further, each honest peer can
serve the complete bulletin board on request. They achieve this by means of a round of
communication collecting signature shares on the bulletin board after each item is posted,
similar to our optimistic protocol for the end-of-period publication. In practice this might
carry an overhead, both in obtaining the agreement and in providing the bulletin board, and
in our context it is not necessary. However, it would be perfectly possibly to run the bulletin
board and only carry this out at the end of the period.
Similar to our approach, peers can also reject posts that clash with previous posts (such as a
second vote on the same ballot form), and the threshold ensures that the collective bulletin
board will not accept posts that clash. Dishonest peers are handled by use of the group
membership protocol: a current group of participating peers is maintained by all honest
peers, and dishonest peers once detected are removed from the group. Peers can also be
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readmitted to the group, in which case they need to bring themselves up to date on the state
of the bulletin board.
A key difference with our approach is the use of the group membership protocol to dy-
namically change the set of ‘live’ peers. Peters provides excellent formal descriptions of the
protocols with sufficient detail to enable code production, and also gives arguments of their
correctness in this setting. However, there is no formal verification of the collection of proto-
cols operating together. The possible interactions between them are quite subtle and require
careful handling, for example how reconfiguration of the group might interact with the post-
ing of items, or how a client may need to switch from an ejected peer to an honest one. Some
dishonest peer behaviour might not trigger removal from the group, but might still interfere
with the protocols, and this possibility requires careful analysis. A second key difference is
the way the (honest) peers need to keep a record of the up to date bulletin board at all times.
Although honest peers in our system will also have a record of the bulletin board if they are
connected and participate in the posting of items, it is not a requirement, and peers are not
relied on for it. A final key difference is in the threat model, which allows dishonest peers but
considers the network itself to be reliable (as we do for liveness), so honest peers can always
communicate with each other. A peer failing to communicate is treated as dishonest. This
will trigger a reconfiguration of the group and makes the protocol more sensitive to minor
communication failures.
STAR-Vote
The use of the bulletin board within STAR-Vote is close to ours: it collects votes during the
election, and publishes only at the end. The voting terminals are networked and play the role
of bulletin board peers: they collect the votes as they are cast, and track which ones are to
be counted. The voter retains a paper receipt as evidence of their vote, which does not reveal
anything of how they voted. The system is designed to tolerate faulty peers. At the end
of the election the voting terminals agree on the votes that have been received, and publish
them in encrypted form on the web so that voters can check them against their receipts. The
electronic record is also checked against the paper copies of the votes retained by the system.
The set of votes is signed by the election authorities to prevent subsequent manipulation.
Following the approach of VoteBox[SDW08], the Voting Terminals maintain a global audit
log during the election using a hash chain, so received votes are committed to in real time,
and past events cannot be tampered with by a subset of malicious machines.
The main difference with our approach is that STAR-Vote is designed for use in a single
polling station. This gives a different threat model, in particular the threats are considered
to come from malicious devices rather than the underlying network. There is no geographic
separation between casting a vote and having it received by the bulletin board peers, and
the local network is assumed to provide reliable communication. STAR-Vote therefore does
not need to address the challenge of posting items to a remote bulletin board, which we have
had to address by having the posting protocol generate a cryptographically signed receipt to
provide the evidence that the item has been received. Currently STAR-Vote does not provide
signatures on the receipts that voters retain, though this is considered as a possibility in the
context of mitigation against a “defaming” attack where voters present falsified evidence
against the bulletin board. STAR-Vote also does not go into detail about how the bulletin
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board information is collated from the peers, in particular what happens when some voting
terminals but not others claim to have received a vote. The emphasis is on detection of
incorrect behaviour rather than its automatic correction. If discrepancies are identified, then
the approach would be to resolve them forensically, by checking audit logs, memory dumps,
and other relevant records.
Byzantine Agreement Protocols
The general problem of achieving generalised agreement across components where some might
fail in adverse ways is known as the Byzantine Agreement problem [LSP82], and there is an
extensive literature on approaches to the problem [Lyn96]. Such protocols require correct
behaviour in strictly more than 2/3 of the peers, the same requirement as we have on our
bulletin board peers. However, Byzantine Agreement protocols are not really suitable for
items being posted. These protocols are typically synchronous and proceed in rounds, which
would be too inefficient for receiving large quantities of votes: too many rounds and too
much synchronisation overhead would be required to process each vote if we wish the peers
to agree on the receipt of every vote. Furthermore, not all peers would necessarily be aware
when a protocol run is starting, since they may not receive the initial item. Instead we have
provided a protocol for the peers simply to send messages to each other and to respond to
messages received in an asynchronous fashion. This means that the peers do not all need
to agree on each vote. Our threat model is also different to the typical threat model for
Byzantine agreement protocols: ours allows honest peers to be excluded from the acceptance
of some items to the bulletin board, without being considered as dishonest, whereas Byzantine
agreement protocols consider any non-participating peer as failing.
We are closer to the problem of Byzantine agreement in the commit and publish phase, since
this is where the peers seek consensus to agree on a bulletin board to publish. Our optimistic
and fallback protocols are indeed close to the Floodset protocol [Lyn96], a basic agreement
protocol. Even in this case we do not require the full power of Byzantine agreement protocols:
the use of signatures minimises the ability of dishonest peers to introduce additional confusing
information to disrupt the protocol run, and we can limit the adversarial behaviour simply
to peers ceasing to communicate.
9.3 Implementation level considerations
The concrete model above has been analysed for correctness, and shown to be correct with
respect to the abstract model. However, even the concrete model is nondeterministic in the
order in which events should be scheduled. This is deliberate, since it means that interac-
tions between protocols are addressed in the analysis, but in practice we will want an efficient
implementation and so will schedule events in a particular way, to avoid expensive computa-
tions such as the fallback protocol unless they are necessary, or for other pragmatic reasons.
For example, the implementation we have developed for the vVote project requires that all
peers should agree on the hash of the bulletin board in order to provide their signature share,
although only a threshold of hashes on the database is sufficient for correctness. We do this
because it is still helpful to know if possible that all peers have the same database, to provide
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reassurance that the protocol is working properly. However, this implementation is consis-
tent with the concrete model, in which peers can start the fallback protocol at any time. As
long as the implementation performs events in accordance with the concrete protocol, it will
provide behaviour that is correct with respect to the abstract specification.
Once published, a web bulletin board will need provide voters with the facilities to confirm
their vote is correctly recorded within the signed bulletin board, and to be able to obtain the
full contents of the signed bulletin board so that the subsequent processing can be checked.
In order to ensure that the board cannot be later replaced with a different signed bulletin
board, the signed hash of the board will also be published at the end of the period using an
out-of-band broadcast channel. For the planned use of the system in Victoria in November
2014, each period will be one day, and the signed hash will be published the following day in
the newspaper. Voters can then check the bulletin board on the web against that published
hash.
There are different ways to make the contents of the bulletin board available. To be consistent
with the commit and publish protocol, all that is needed is the peers are able to produce
shares on a threshold signature of what is produced. It may simply make the entire bulletin
board available for download, and then the voter will check its signature and that their vote
is included (and not cancelled) within it. Alternatively it may make use of a structure such
as a hash tree [GTT09] which provides signature authentication that an item is included on
the bulletin board without the need to download the entire board. In our case we need to
check not only that a vote is present, but also that there is also no cancellation present. In
practice this may be done by also publishing and signing the entire set of cancellations, since
this is likely to be small compared to the set of votes cast. Checking the presence of a vote
then involves confirming both that a vote is present in the hash tree and that it has not been
cancelled. This is the subject of ongoing research.
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